After briefly reviewing the new institutionalism, this article uses the history of political reform in Africa to test its key tenet: that power, if properly organized, is a productive resource. It does so by exploring the relationship between changes in political institutions and changes in economic performance, both at the macro-and the microlevel. The evidence indicates that political reform (Granger) caused increases in GDP per capita in the African subset of panels of global data. And it demonstrates that changes in national political institutions in Africa strongly relate to changes in total factor productivity in agriculture.
Introduction
This article characterizes what many call "the new institutionalism" and explores its relevance to Africa. In doing so, it focuses on a core hypothesis in this literature: that there is a positive relationship between democracy and development (Lipset, 1959) .
Given the magnitude and speed of political change in late-century Africa (see Figure 1) , the continent has generated ample data with which to test this hypothesis.
Our exploration addresses both those interested in the new institutionalism and those interested in Africa per se. For the former, it offers an opportunity for testing. For the latter, it offers an opportunity to probe the economic realities of Africa armed with the insights from the new institutionalism. In particular, it teaches us the degree to which changes in political institutions -i.e. political reform -may have changed political incentives, thereby weakening the commitment of governments to policies that retarded the growth of Africa's economies.
In Section 2A we introduce the new institutionalism, employing public choice theory as a useful foil. In doing so, we introduce and describe the so-called "Lipset hypothesis". In Section 2b, we provide an overview of political and economic changes in Africa, emphasizing the sharp, late-century changes in political institutions and government policies. We devote Section 3 to the analysis of macro-level data and document the distinctive position occupied by Africa in global samples: in Africa, but not elsewhere, we show, democracy is positively related to (indeed, Granger causes) economic growth.
Section 4 begins the search for causal channels between democratization and growth, arguing from "micro-" foundations: electoral reform, party competition, and changes in the location of the median voter, on the one hand, and changes in the rate of growth of total factor productivity (TFP) in agriculture on the other.
Background

2.A The Approach
To introduce the new institutionalism, it is useful to juxtapose it against public choice theory -an approach which it has largely eclipsed. The contrast between the two schools highlights the new institutionalist's core argument: that political power can be socially productive.
As do others (Hirshleifer 1994) , public choice theorists identify two routes to the accumulation of wealth. One is production and exchange in markets and the other the use of power in politics. In markets, they argue, no one need consent to an exchange that renders him worse off. Insofar as the pursuit of wealth takes place within markets, then, it is compatible with the social welfare (Buchanan 1989) . In political settings, by contrast, power can be marshaled to elicit involuntary transfers. This is true when political institutions underpin despots, of course; but, Buchanan and others argue (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock 1962) , it is also true in democracies, where political majorities can expropriate minorities and where concentrated minorities, for their part, can use public power to extract private benefits while distributing the costs widely. The public choice school thus views power as a threat to social welfare.
Contrast this argument with that of the new institutionalists (e.g. North and Thomas 1973; North 1981; North 1990) . While conceding that indeed power can destroy wealth, they also insist that it can promote its creation. Highlighting the pervasiveness of market failure, they note that political sanctions can be structured so as to strengthen the forces of production. Tort law weakens incentives for non-performance, for example, making possible agreements that previously would have been shunned. And governments can enforce property rights in ways that align private interests with the social welfare in situations that might otherwise have led to opportunistic -and self-defeating-behavior.
Whereas the public choice school emphasized the use of coercion to impose involuntary losses, the new institutionalists thus emphasize its use to facilitate social gains. They view political institutions as a form of capital that, if properly configured, can unleash the productive potential of the economy, making economic growth possible (Bates et al. 2002) .
In search of evidence for such arguments, the new institutionalism has pursued several lines of inquiry. Of particular relevance to Africa is research into the relationship between democracy and development.
Writing in 1959, Seymour Martin Lipset reported a strong and positive correlation between income per capita and democracy in a global cross section of nations (Lipset 1959) . Lipset interpreted his findings as suggesting that economic development leads to democracy. But those who work on Africa endorsed another interpretation: that democratic governments were more likely to promote economic development --an interpretation more in keeping with institutionalist arguments.
2.B The Case of Africa
As documented in academic studies (Ndulu et al. 2008 ) and official reports (World Bank 1991), those addressing Africa's poor economic performance in the post-independence period traced its roots to Africa's political systems. Overwhelmingly single party or military regimes, (see Figure 1 ), they were narrowly based, resting on a coalition composed of urban-based, public-sector employees, manufacturers, and industrial firms.
As best summarized in (Ndulu et al. 2008) , the economic policies of many of these regimes were characterized (inter alia) by:
 Tariff policies that protected domestic manufacturing (but not agriculture).
 Industrial regulations that conferred market power on the producers of manufactured goods but on the purchasers of agricultural products.
 Over-valuation of domestic currencies.
Given that manufacturing received tariff protection from imports, while farmiing did not, the last of these measures further tilted relative prices in favor of the urban sector.
Taken together, these policies shifted relative prices against agriculture -the largest single sector of most of Africa's economies. One result was slower growth, as incentives eroded for persons to invest capital or labor power in farming.
1 Given that agricultural exports generated a significant portion of Africa's earnings in foreign markets, another was external debt.
Although international donors pressured Africa's governments for policy reform, the governments were reluctant to comply. While Africa's farmers stood to benefit from policy reform, they lay widely scattered, resided in culturally distinctive communities, and therefore found it difficult to organize. As the logic of collective action (Olson 1985 , Bates 1981 , Becker 1983 ) would suggest, the urban coalition -highly concentrated spatially and economically --therefore prevailed, and the policies remained in place despite theri economic costs.
Recognizing the political forces at play, those who sought to alter government policies and thereby secure the renewal of economic growth in Africa sought to alter Africa's political institutions. They sought thereby to alter political incentives so that politicians 1 As reported in Ndulu et al. (2008) . The adoption of these policies (which, taken together, they call "control regimes") imposed a loss of nearly two percentage points to the annual rate of growth.
would no longer regard such policies as politically impregnable. In particular, they recognized that should Africa's rural dwellers once again be able to vote, then, given their numbers, their interests, and their presence in numerous electoral districts, they could render policies that damaged the fortunes of farming politically unsustainable. In pursuit of policy reform, Africa's creditors abroad therefore joined domestic reformers at home in demanding a return to open political competition and majority rule.
In the absence of political reform, financial institutions could -and did -suspend further lending. In pursuit of international capital and domestic political support, Africa's governments capitulated, conceding the right to form opposition parties that could compete for votes (see Figure 1) . Importantly, the change in institutions enfranchised a largely rural electorate.
These changes were inherently valuable; for social scientists, moreover, they offered an opportunity to observe and to measure the relationship between political institutions and economic performance. Section 3 relates political reform in Africa to the growth of national incomes. Section 4 relates political change to changes in total factor productivity in agriculture. Both report evidence supportive of institutionalist arguments.
Institutions and Development
When exploring the relationship between democracy and economic performance in Africa, we employ an augmented version of the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator (Pesaran et al. 1999 ) which relaxes the assumption of cross-sectional parameter homogeneity. We thereby gain access to variation unavailable to previous researchers, and in doing so detect a statistically significant relationship between political institutions and economic performance that had eluded them 2 .
In Africa, we find, institutional reform appears to have proven economically productive.
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The model we estimate is: Based on this model, we explored the direction of (Granger) causality between institutions and income in both the global sample and the African sub-sample of the data.
As Table 1 shows, for the global sample the direction of causality cannot be established:
democracy Granger causes income and income Granger causes democracy. However, for the Africa subsample, Granger causality runs from democrcy to income. We then proceed to analyze income as a function of democracy for Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 2 ). The first column reports the PMG estimates and the second column presents the mean group estimator results. The Hausman test in column 3 result testifies to the validity of the long-run homogeneity restrictions imposed by the PMG estimator. The coefficients generated by the PMG estimator suggest that democracy is positively and significantly related to income. Given that the model is linear log, the coeffient estimate suggests that a one unit increase in the Polity score is associated with a 1.5% increase in income per capita.
Political reform in Africa thus appears to have generated evidence that supports the arguments of both reformers and scholars alike and produced higher incomes for Africa's impoverished economies.
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Recent political developments suggest that these gains are under threat, however. While "17 countries are leading the way" (Radelet, 2010), a sumber seem to be backsliding.
Over the past decade, there have been seven successful coups and a further six failed attempts. Over the same period, according to the Ibrahim Index, in 15 countries, governance failed to improve 5 , while, according to The African President's Index , in 22, leadership was extremely poor. 6 Political incumbents in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Senegal and Uganda successfully altered their constitutions in order to allow them to compete yet again for the presidency (see Posner and Young, 2007) ; in each instance, the incumbents, having won, remained in office. While Africa has benefitted from political reform, the process appears to have slowed.
Evidence from the Micro-Level
The evidence thus far has come from the macro-level: It consists of relationships between political institutions and measures of the total economic product. In the section that follows, we draw upon finer features of the polity and upon micro-level data on the economy to explore once again the relationship between political institutions and economic performance.
We argue that by enfranchising a largely rural electorate, institutional reform shifted the "center of mass" of Africa's political economies 7 from the relatively small urban core to the larger rural sector, thereby rendering previous policies politically unsustainable. The result, we suggest, was policy reform and the strengthening of incentives for farming: the largest single industry in most African economies.
6 The African Presidents Index: The good, the bad and the ugly. The East African. Nairobi. December 27, 2010 -January 2, 2011.
7 Or, more correctly, median voter. See Shepsle (2010).
4.A Total Factor Productivity
As our measure of the performance of farmers, we draw on the research of Steven Block (2010), who combined data from 44 countries over 46 years to generate estimates of changes in total factor productivity growth in African agriculture. In the initial years of independence, he found, total factor productivity dramatically declined.
In the early 1980s, however, it began to grow. And by the early 2000s, its average annual rate of growth was over four times faster than it had been 25 years earlier. His estimates suggest that the average rate of TFP growth in the baseline estimate is 0.97% per year, a figure that falls to 0.87% per year when we adjust for land quality and to 0.59% per year when we include adjustments for the quality of labor.
For our purposes, however, the key finding is the post-independence decline and subsequent rise of cross-country agricultural productivity growth in Africa, which give rise to two questions: Did changes in Africa's political institutions bear a systematic relationship to changes in the performance of Africa's rural economy? And, if so, through what mechanism did their impact run? We argue that they did, both directly and through their impact on government policies.
4.B. The Data
Using aggregate crop output figures for each country, and Africa-specific prices and PPP exchange rates, Block derives his estimates from a semi-parametric specification of a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:
where y i (t) is aggregate crop output for country i in year t, x ij (t) is a vector of j conventional agricultural inputs (land, chemical fertilizer, tractors, and livestock); z ij (t) are quality shifters associated with these inputs (average years of schooling to adjust labor quality, as well as rainfall and irrigated land share to adjust for the quality of land); p ij (t) are other potential explanations for TFP growth (to include political competition);
TD are annual time dummies; and CD are country dummies. All variables are in logs, normalized by the size of the labor force in agriculture.
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To derive the country-specific rates of agricultural TFP growth, Block estimates equation
(1) country-by-country. The "baseline" estimates (shown in the cross-country aggregates in Figure 2 ) exclude the adjustments for input quality contained in the vector z. He then re-estimates the function while adjusting for land quality (by controlling for the effect of annual rainfall and irrigated land share), and then re-estimates it once again while adjusting as well for labor quality (by controlling for average years of schooling). While the estimate of TFP growth is reduced by the extent to which those additional variables "explain" the initial baseline estimate, the adjustments help to differentiate between productivity increases resulting from the use of improved inputs from those that result from increases in the efficiency with which these inputs are employed.
When relating these changes in total factor productivity to changes in political institutions, we make use of a scale that provides a measure of the degree of political competition that the incumbent chief executive faced when coming to office. 9 For each country in each year, the scale assigns a number that indicates whether:
1 --No executive exists.
2 -An executive exists but was not elected.
3 -The executive was elected, but was the sole candidate.
4 -The executive was elected, with multiple candidates competing for the office.
5 --Multiple parties were also able to contest the executive elections.
6 --Candidates from more than one party competed in executive elections, and the winner won more than 75% of the votes.
7 --Candidates from more than one party competed in executive elections, and the winner won less than 75% of the vote. We employ as our measure a dummy variable, named "electoral competition," that takes the value 1 when a government is rated 6 or above and 0 otherwise.
When discussing public policy, we employ two measures. One is the black market premium (BMP) for foreign exchange. While the BMP is a direct measure of exchange rate misalignment, we follow Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) who view BMP as a proxy for broader distortions in macroeconomic policy.
Our second policy indicator is the nominal rate of assistance to agricultural importables, a sectoral indicator of trade policy intervention, which we take from the World Bank's database on Distortions to Agricultural Incentives (Anderson 2009 ). When an ad valorem tariff is the sole policy intervention for good (x), the nominal rate of assistance for commodity x is:
where t m is tariff rate, E is the nominal exchange rate, and P is the dollar-denominated world price of the commodity. The nominal rates of assistance for individual crops may be aggregated to form the nominal rate of assistance for agricultural importables (NRA_totm), which are typically foodgrains. Food imports compete with the product of Africa's famers for the domestic market and the NRA_totm therefore determines the prices at which local producers can sell what they grow. It also influences the distribution of income, as the lower prices that reduce the incomes of rural producers enhance the purchasing power of urban consumers. It follows from our central line of reasoning that the enfranchisement of the rural majority should be associated with decreased assistance for competing agricultural imports.
Lastly, we also make use of the Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA), calculated as:
where NRA ag/nonag represents an aggregate index of the commodity-specific NRAs for the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of each country. The RRA provides a measure of the relative level of protection conferred upon agricultural and non-agricultural (manufactured) goods. When agriculture is relatively favored by trade, the RRA is greater than one; when disfavored, it is less. The RRA therefore provides a measure of "urban bias". Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for these data.
4.B. Bivariate Relations
To motivate the analysis that follows, we introduce Figure 3 , which distinguishes the time path of TFP growth rates 10 in observations with and without electoral competition Note that the TFP growth rate in settings characterized by electoral competition progressively diverges from the TFP growth rate in settings that lack it. On average, 10 Net of adjustments for input quality.
countries with electoral competition experienced agricultural TFP growth of 1.04% per year, while the average rate was only 0.48% per year in countries without.
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We also introduce Figure The data suggest that governments headed by an executive chosen in a competitive election not only spend more on agricultural research, secure higher levels of educational attainment, and pave a larger percentage of their roads. The data also suggest that they exercise greater fiscal and monetary restraint than do their authoritarian counterparts (as indicated by the virtual absence of black markets for their currencies) and intervene in markets in ways less likely to shift relative prices against farmers (as indicated by their relative rates of assistance). Calculating the means, we apply one-sided t-tests to the differences and find each to be significant and in the expected direction. Governments in competitive political systems adopt policies that lower the costs, increase the earnings, and strengthen the incentives for farmers.
11 These averages are statistically different in a two-sided t-test (P = 0.0014).
In the estimates we develop below, we focus in particular on the nominal rate of assistance to agricultural importables. In Figure 5 , we superimpose a smoothed version of the mean RRA over the TFP growth profiles. The Figure underscores that TFP growth declined when urban bias was increasing and increased when urban bias was decreasing.
The difference in the mean growth rates is statistically different at greater than the .01-level.
To probe deeper and more rigorously, we turn to multivariate analysis.
4.C. A Deeper Look
Tables 5-7 provide both the structure of and evidence for our argument. They report the total effect of institutional reform on the growth of total factor productivity in agriculture; the mediated effect, i.e. its impact on policies that themselves affect TFP growth; and the direct effect (McKinnon 2008; Imai et al., 2010) . Given that political reform and the growth of total factor productivity in agriculture could be the joint products of variables excluded from the analysis, in each table, we introduce country fixed effects to account for (at least) the time-invariant unobservable characteristics. 12 And because of the 12 Block (2010), among others, found that expenditures on agricultural R&D explain a substantial share of TFP growth, and our illustrative result in Figure 4 indicates that spending on R&D is higher in settings with electoral competition. Thus, we must be concerned that excluding R&D expenditures from our specification, which we are forced to do by the lack of a sufficiently large common sample, introduces potential bias into our estimates of the effect of electoral competition on TFP. However, the magnitude of possibility of reciprocal causality in the relationship between political reform and productivity growth, we also make use of instrumental variables, introducing the level of political competition in neighboring states (lagged by one year) and the end of the Cold War as excluded instruments in a fixed effects two-stage least squares estimator.
13 Table 4 competition. The simple correlation between R&D expenditures and EIEC is low (0.11) and the R-squared in a fixed-effects regression of (log) R&D on our electoral competition dummy is essentially zero (0.0008).
These considerations suggest that excluding R&D from our specifications does not significantly influence our finding for electoral competition. In addition, virtually all of the variation in R&D is "between" rather than "within" variation (the between coefficient of variation is nearly 4 times greater than the within),
suggesting that country dummies absorb nearly all of the variation in R&D. percentage point (column 2). 14 We introduce additional controls, seeking to take into account the impact of Africa's endemic civil conflicts and the share of its rural population. These controls enter (individually in columns 3 and 4, and together in column 5) with the expected signs and have no impact on our estimated effect of electoral competition on agricultural TFP growth. In column 6 we deepen our analysis by including the interaction between our dummy for electoral competition and the rural population share. We hypothesize that if outcomes favorable to agriculture are more likely when policymakers face electoral competition, then the magnitude of the effect should itself be a positive function of the rural population share. The results in column 5 are therefore suggestive: the point estimates increase with the rural population share.
They are not statistically different from one another, however.
In Table 5 , we explore the impact of institutions on policy choice, which we view as mediating between the introduction of political competition and growth of total factor productivity. We assess the effect of electoral competition on the two policy variables -RRA (in columns 1 and 2) and BMP (in columns 3 and 4). In both sets of equations, we allow the effect of electoral competition to vary as a function of the rural population share; and we estimate each model by both fixed effects and fixed effects two-stage least squares using the identification strategy outlined above.
The coefficients in column 1 confirm that the magnitude of the relationship between institutional change and policy choice is a function of the size of the rural electorate: the greater the portion of the total population that lives in rural areas, the greater the reduction in urban bias (e.g., the higher or less negative the RRA) when governments must compete for votes. Column 2 corrects for the potential endogeneity of electoral competition and confirms that more favorable treatment is given farmers by governments that must compete for votes to secure public office. We also find (in columns 3 and 4) that electoral competition reduces the black market premium.
In Table 6 , we estimate the direct and indirect impact of institutional change by adding our mediating policy variables, RRA and BMP, to the specification from Table 4 . In columns 1 and 3, respectively, we first measure the total impact (for the available sample set of observations) of electoral competition by excluding each policy variable. In columns 2 and 4, we then add the policy variables. The change in the point estimate for electoral competition when the policy variable is added provides an estimate of the extent to which electoral competition operates through its impact on the policy variable.
Comparing the point estimates for electoral competition in columns 1 and 2, we find little effect of including RRA. This suggests that while RRA is influenced by electoral competition, most of total effect of electoral competition is direct; it runs through channels other than its impact on relative prices. Columns 3 and 4 suggest that some of the effect of electoral competition on agricultural TFP growth may operate through improved macroeconomic policy. The estimated coefficient on electoral competition is reduced by the inclusion of black market premium, though the difference in the point estimates for electoral competition in columns 3 and 4 is not statistically significant.
15
Electoral competition thus leads directly to an increase in the growth rate of agricultural TFP growth on the order of one percentage point. Moreover, given that the majority of the electorate resides in rural areas, when competing for majorities at the polls, politicians, we have seen, now have strong incentives to adopt policies that increase the returns to farming. We can speculate on additional channels through which it might operate. They include the return of private agents to the rural economy, the reduced regulation of agricultural markets, improved rural infrastructure, and increased rural incomes as a result of greater government spending on roads and public facilities.
Conclusion
The late century changes in Africa's political institutions constituted a natural experiment, enabling scholars to test institutionalist arguments. In this article, we have sought to take advantage of the data thus supplied, both to assess the power of institutionalist arguments and to achieve a deeper understanding of economic development in Africa.
performance. At the macro-level, political reform is (Granger) causally related to economic growth; and at the micro-level, positively and significantly related to TFP growth in agriculture. The latter relationship is both direct and through its impact on government policies. Given that Africa's electorate is largely rural, the movement to majoritarian institutions led to the creation of an electorate dominated by farmers, thus weakening the governments' commitment to policies favoring consumers at the expense of the producers of agricultural products.
Our analysis of Africa's "great experiment" thus suggests that the hopes of the late century reformers were fulfilled: changes in institutions led to changes in policy and to economic growth. They also suggest that the new instituionalism is right: the structure of political institutions influences the performance of economies. In doing so, they offer reasons for concerned citizens to continue to mount a defense of the political reforms secured by their predecessors. significance of all estimated coefficients on such lags. We also report the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. 
